

Implication of Terrorism and Insurgency for Sustainable Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria.

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Abstract: The Boko Haram sect started as shahaba groups in 1995, a Muslim Youth organization headed by Abubakar Lawan, who later left for study at the University of Medians and, thereafter, Yusuf Mohammed took over from him and is believed to have made the group politically influential and popular. This paper attempts to examine the characteristics of the sect which activities became profound particularly in northern Nigeria in 2009. Content Analytical Approach was adopted as methodology. The Study identifies terrorism and insurgency as the major strategies of the Boko Haram Sect. The group made greater and devastating impact on sustainable national development in Nigeria than other terrorists before it like Maitasine and Shiite groups. It becomes imperative, therefore to trace its origins, ideology and propelling force. Apparently, the sect is believed to be linked with other Islamic terror groups. The propelling force of Boko Haram are identified to include religious extremism, and anger over its members killing particularly Yusuf Mohammed, their leader and the endemic poverty in Northern Nigeria. Among various strategies adopted by government of Nigeria in particular, international community and stakeholders to checkmate and possibly end the onslaught include coercion, state of emergency in the north, offer of dialogue, negotiation and amnesty. Regrettably, all these efforts coupled with the current military approach have so far failed to bring the hostilities to an end. The paper attributes the persistence of terrorism encapsulated in Boko Haram hostilities to bad governance, poverty, poor education, youth unemployment, as well as primitive and distorted value orientation; improper definition of the war, amongst others. These, must be addressed via the instrumentality of sound and deliberate policies so as to mitigate the scourge.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Terrorism, Insurgency, Sustainable socio-economic development, Nigeria.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Following the September 11, 2001 Al-Qaeda attack on the United States of America, which subsequently informed the declaration of the “war on terrorism by the US, terrorism issues assumed prominence in international political discourse. This unsuspected attack as it were, showed how a super power can be challenged to the fore front by an organized non state group (Falode, 2016).

Similarly, terrorism and insurgency in the African continent has continued to dominate political discourse among academics and scholars. The resultant effect of the many restless stages through which Africa has passed is the endemic economic and social deprivation which mars socio-economic and development and heighten unrest of various magnitude and dimension in Africa political landscape. The various insurgency uprising in the black continent may appear as African continental headache but as Nkwede and Nwogbaga (2017), noted, has negative impact and far global implications.

Since the Arab spring that swept through Egypt, Tunisia, Libya at Yemen, Mali and Nigeria in 2011, the spate of terrorism and insurgency has assumed a monumental dimension hampering meaningful social and economic development in Africa; the efforts of successive government in most African countries to stem the tide and hence, ensure national and political stability notwithstanding. To this end, Abah (2003), attributes the genesis of the problem to uncondusive socio-political and economic environments prevalent in developing countries which essentially stem from inefficient planning and trade terms, dearth of ideas, dependency, graft and related anti-social behaviours. The above scenario depicts the level of under development prevalent in most African countries such that one is persuaded to agree with Abah (2003) that most of Africa is not developing”.

Nigeria is not an exception of unconventional insurgency with the attendant political instability, crisis of sustainable socio-economic development and legitimacy crisis. Since the 1960 independence, Nigeria has experienced attack by terrorists like the maitasine of the 1980 and 1982, (Anyanwu and Nwanaju, 2010); the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) that occurred between 2000 and 2010 and the Boko Haram Terrorist crisis which is still ravaging the country since 2009 till date.

Evidently, much has been written about the origin, objectives and dimension of Boko Haram insurgency. Most worrisome is that the Boko Haram insurgency started at the wake of the nation's efforts to resuscitate the socio-economic problems created by the Niger Delta militants. This indeed has remained topical and constitute a serious cause of concern to government and the private sector economy of Nigeria. To the government in particular, the question of insurgency has recently become a crucial issue in the Nigeria's struggle for good governance, sustainable democracy and socio-economic development.

As noted by Alao, and Atere (2015); Asogwa and Okibe (2015) and Nkwede and Nwogbaga (2017), the increasing spread of notorious terrorism in the black continent particularly, Nigeria with the resultant losses of lives and means of livelihood is a growing concern that cannot be waved aside. Thus, the antecedents of the Boko Haram insurgency and its implications for sustainable socio-economic development of Nigeria, constitute the primary objective of this paper. Hence, the paper shall attempt to provide answers to the following and related questions:

- Why has terrorism/insurgency persisted in Nigeria despite government efforts to quell it?
- What are the implications of terrorism and insurgency for sustainable socio-economic development in Nigeria?

II. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Terrorism

The U.S State defines terrorism as “the use or threatened use of violence for political purposes to create a state of fear that will aid in extorting, coercing, intimidating, or otherwise causing individuals and groups to alter their behavior” (Ajibola, 2015). It is also seen to “consist of illegal attacks and threats against people or property by a group for the purpose of weakening a hated political authority” Terrorism assumes an international dimension at a point the terrorist groups, their operational targets, venue and modality of attacks becomes the concern of more than one state or country (Roskin and Berry, 1990). A United Nations secretary general report of November, 2004, described terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act (UN, 2005)”.

Terrorism may be practiced by opposing political parties, nationalistic groups, religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling government; in which case, it is termed as state Terrorism. Examples of terrorism are the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, the underground bombing in London, bombing in Bali in 2002 which were initiated and carried out by close allies and like-minded social networks which as it were, benefitted from uninhibited information, technology and telecommunications flows enabling it to succeed where others had failed (Sageman, 2004 in Ajibola, 2015).

Insurgency

Insurgency lacks consensus conceptualization in social science discipline. Attempts at defining insurgency is surrounded by confusion and difficulties because beyond the ubiquity is a further problem as to whether the concept itself merits to be considered on intellectual context much as it is a contested concept involving varieties of subjectivity about its meaning and use. Despite the various dimension which the fluidity of insurgency presents, its definition can be approached from ideological perspective as well as within the ambit of individual perception. For O'Neill (1990), Merari (1993), Hammes (2006) and Reed (2007), insurgency is an element of political violence. O'Neill (1990) particularly defined insurgency as a “struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics”. Hammes (2006), noted that “insurgents have the objective of distracting a government from functioning normally. This situation is made because it is easier to accomplish the goal of insurgent groups than the exercise of governance moreso, when one considers that it is easier to resort to militarism than application of political and socio-economic techniques which governance entails. In other words, while the insurgents can use violent activities to make a government illegitimate, such government cannot restore its legitimacy by simply resorting to counter violence.

It becomes crystal clear from the above standpoint that insurgency is more of a political struggle and not a military combat per se and as such, it is not amendable to a wholesome military approach in a bid to find solution without resorting to unacceptable brutality. No doubts, insurgents are historically known to place emphasis on defeating the political will of the perceived enemy rather than conquering the enemy army using direct battle approach. Insurgents indeed, comprise loose coalition of like-minded and interested networks ranging from local to transitional and accordingly operate from local to transitional (Read, 2007 and Hassan, 2014).

In this paper, insurgency is perceived from the political, economic and religions contexts targeted on the state or a regime by a group who is dissatisfied with a prevailing situation with the intention to create

attention/influence through the instrumentality of guerilla warfare, violence, terrorism and other tactics and strategies.

Boko Hara Insurgency: History, strategy and connections

Due to the multiplicity of views among scholars that characterize the Boko Haram concept, it is tasking to actually synthesize the divergent views to arrive at a definition of the concept. (Nkwede, 2015). Be that as it may, we shall attempt in this study to grasp the conventional meaning of Boko Haram. In the Arabic context, Boko Haram is jamaatu Ahlis Suma Liddaawati Wal-Jihad, translated in English to mean “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s Teaching and Jihad” (Falode, 2016). In Hausa language, Boko Haram means “Western Education is Evil” and it is a local radical salafist movement that morphed after 2009 into terrorist establishment with execution of Jihad as its primary preoccupation (Ojo, 2013). Based in the northern Nigeria and populated by the Kaanuris, Boko Haram is believed to have originated in 1995 as a movement called Sahaba and Abubakar Lawan as its leader, who left for study at the University of Medians and thereafter, Yusuf Mohammed took over from him and is believed to have advanced the group to political prominence and fame. Soon afterwards, Yusuf jettisoned some of the original doctrines, got Sahaba reorganized and renamed it in 2002. From 2002 to 2009, Yusuf successfully gained a marmount faithful’s comprising youth and established a religions complex made up of mosque and a school in Maiduguru for the indoctrination of his converts. Soon his followership extended to such places like Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Katsina and Yobe as well as Cameroon and Chad. Initially, Boko Haram fought to establish sharia government in Borno state but following Yusuf death in 2009, it began to extend its goals to out rightly Islamize the whole of Nigeria state. The circularity of Nigeria notwithstanding.

Prior to 2010, the sect had no apparent strategy to achieve its avowed objective. It sometimes, used guerilla strategy of hitting and running away from a scene to intimidate people within its operational areas using rudimentary weapons such as clubs, machets, den guns, swords and as well as axe in some cases. They occasionally shot sporadically from motorcycles at their victims and speed off. However, from 2010 onwards, Boko Haram sect has been positioned to use bombs and improved explosive devices (IEDs) on strategic locations and currently even use sophisticated weapons like AK-47, rifles, grenades, rock propelled grenades, automatic rifles, surface-to-airmissles, vehicle mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T.55 tanks, Pauchard ERC – 90 sagaie and explosives such as Semtx (Caupbell, 2014). Indeed, their operational tactics have become more sophisticated both in responding to counter-security operations by the Nigerian Army as well as in their efforts to kick-start sectarian conflicts.

The Boko Haram sect has external connections with like-minded jihadist group such as Al-shabab and Alqaeda from where the sect obtain its funding, fighters, weapons and technical expertise in bombs and explosive manufacturing .

Sustainable Socio-economic Development

To a large extent, socio-economic development refers to the process of social and economic improvement in a society. Indicators such as Gross Demestic Products, GDP, life-Expectancy, literacy and employment levels as well as health are used to measure the state of socio-economic development in any given society. In addition, changes in less-tangible factors such as personal dignity, freedom of association, safety/security and the extent of participation in civil society are also considered in this connection.

Similarly, socio-economic development is a process which seeks to identify both social and economic needs in a community and strives to strategize in practical terms the ways and means of ensuring the best interest of a community in the long run. In short, it is generally referred to as a mechanism which guarantees the overall improvement in the standard of living of a people.

In the light of the forgoing, socio-economic development is seen as a transformation process that guarantees a better living conditions of a people in an environment while factoring in economic, social, cultural and political needs and wants. Location have refers to community and the geographical habitation of a socio-economic entity (O’Neill, 1990).

Sustainable socio-economic development essentially connotes a long-term sustenance of human and material resources as well as ensuring that programmes exist continually long after they are established. By extension, sustainable development deals with a kind of development that is participatory in terms of human and the protection of the environment where people live and these are determined by the Human Development Index (HDI) (Udu and Nkwede, 2014).

The Human Development Index according to Aro (2013), involves a combination of a measure of purchasing power with that of physical habit and level of education attained by the individual. These three components of HDI provide an option of the GNP in determining the relative socio-economic advancements of nations. It also enables citizens of nations and their governments to assess their levels of progress over a period

of time and to determine areas of priority where policy interventions are required as well as allowing nations to compare their local experiences with those of other countries in similar situations.

Granting that socio-economic development is participatory and centered on human beings in addition to other related aspects mentioned earlier, its indicators for our use in this study: “implications of terrorism and insurgency for sustainable socio-economic development in Nigeria” shall concern levels of lasting infrastructural facilities, human capacity development as well as other related factors.

Theoretical Foundation

This study is premised on the clash of civilization theoretical paradigm originally propounded by Huntington (1993). As argued by Huntington the major assumptions of this theory is that “people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post cold war world”. Accordingly, the age of ideology had ended; the world is now faced with cultural conflict rooted in civilizations. Huntington went on to posit that conflicts will tend to revolve around cultural and religious lines in future years and by extension, the concept of different civilizations as the highest rank of cultural identity, will definitely become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.

Similarly, in the opinion of Ezeani and Chilaka (2013), Conflict in the modern world will resort not primarily from ideology or economic sources but dominantly from cultural dichotomy among humans. They further asserted that the nation states will continue to be the most powerful actors in affairs of the world but the major conflicts of global politics will happen between nations and groups of different civilizations. Global politics will be dominated by the clash of civilizations and the “fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future”.

In other words, different civilizations afford people the answers about their social norms, how individuals live their lives and their relationship with others which more or less frees people to choose how they perceive their lives should be most fulfilling. It should be clearly pointed out that it is history, language, customs/culture, tradition and religious beliefs that differentiate civilizations. The world is divided along these lines and as such, conflicts becomes unavoidable.

Proponents of this theory further argue that civilization conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims, pointing out the “Bloody borders” between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations. They further noted that some of the factors that contribute to this conflict are that western civilization which has been predominantly influenced by Christianity and the Islamic civilization are:

- i. Both are Missionary religions that seek the conversion of others;
- ii. Universalism – both are “all or nothing religions” as both perceive their faith to be the only correct one ;
- iii. Teleological religions, implying that their values and beliefs are representation of the main goal and existential essence of humans; and,
- iv. People who violate the basic principles of those religions are perceived as irreligious and are regarded as people living a life of vanity.

It is implied in Huntington’s view point that other factors which contribute to “Western-Islamic clash are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam” in addition to western values of universalism which asserts that all civilizations should adopt western values-a view that infuriates Islamic fundamentalists. According to Huntington, a combination of “these historical and modern factors would undoubtedly lead to bloody clash between the Islamic and western civilizations”.

The clash of civilization theory is relevant to this study because, it significantly reflects the Boko Haram driving force which is assumed to religion and which Huntington identified to be the most fundamental factor in the clash of civilizations. Secondly, Boko Haram insurgency can safely be appreciated within the framework of the clash of civilization theory if one takes a careful look at the trend of Nigeria politics with intermittent violent extremism which is past becoming intractable.

Methodology

Qualitative Research method was adopted in carrying out investigations in this study. Data used in the study were gathered predominately from the secondary sources basically from libraries, publications, internet sources, journals, periodicals and media commentaries. A combination of Trend and content analytical techniques were used in data presentation and analysis. Tables and figures used in the study were carefully extracted and analysed in consonance with their specific relevances within the different sections of the study.

III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Spate of Attacks

Since 2009, the Boko Haram sect has carried out numerous attacks in Nigeria, killing an estimated 20,000 people and rendering over 2 millions homeless (Sahara Reports, 2017). The famous incidences were the bombings of Nigeria police Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011; the UN House in Abuja, August 26, 2011; that of the Christmas day at St. Theresa Catholic Church Madalla on December 25, 2011 which made headlines around the world. Others were the bombing of the Headquarters of the 1 Division Nigerian Army and Kawo bridge in Kaduna on 7 February, 2012 (Omale 2013) in Ajibola (2015). There were equally multiple bomb blasts in Kano on Friday January 20, 2012 which affected zone one of the Nigeria police force Headquarters along Buk road, the police state command Bompai, Divisional police stations, Yar'akwa, farm centre and Sabon Gari. Others were the SSS Headquarters, Giginyu and immigration passport office to mention but a few.

Similarly, on May 16, 2013, there was an attack in Daura, Katsina state where four banks were robbed and a police station and prison facility burnt. Indeed the activities of the Boko Haram sect are too numerous to cite without boring the reader. However, it is important to note that the sect combined bombing, killing, assassination, robbery, rape and kidnapping in its operations. Notable among these were the abduction of seven expatriates in Bauchi, five Lebanese, a Briton and an Italian who were staff of SETRACO construction company and the abduction of 276 girls from Chibok in April, 2014 and that of 110 school girls at Dapchi on February 19, 2016 by the leader of Boko Haram factional group, Abu Mus'ab al Barnawi (Udu, 2017).

It is abundantly clear that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is one of the major governance problem occasioning serious threat to socio-economic development of the country. From disturbing political killing to dare devil banditry the concomitant effect is the same helplessness where both the rich and the poor, the civilian and even the military are gripped with palpable fear. The table below shows a summary of recorded deaths and attacks by the Boko Haram from 2009 to 2017.

Table 1: Rate of Boko Haram Attacks and Deaths Recorded, July, 2009-2017

Year	No of Attacks	No of Deaths Recorded	Source
2009	4	79	Nkwede & Nwogba, 2016
2010	4	340	
2011	35	430	
2012	37	610	
2013	26	720	
2014	28	1,950	
2015	20	2,569	
2016	4	74	
2017	150	900	BBC, monitoring, 2017
	308	7,663	

One can observe from the above table that intensity attacks kept increasing such that although number of attacks reduced in 2013, 2014 and 2015, death rate hiked far above those recorded in 2011 and 2012 that had higher number of attacks recorded. One can deduce that the intensity of attacks and the resultant deaths in 2013, 2014 and 2015 can safely be attributed to the use of more sophisticated weapons by the Boko Haram sect much more than at the rudimentary periods of 2009 and 2010. Be that as it may, one can observe a reduction in death tolls as well as a de-escalation of attacks in the 2016 year which again increased in 2017. This is attributable to the management of the hostilities by the Federal Government and its military.

Government Responses to Boko Haram

Prior to 2010, Boko Haram activities consisted mainly of civil, social and religious disobedience to acceptable societal norms. During those periods, the Nigerian police used roadblocks and arrests extensively in an attempt to curb the offensives. When these measures proved inadequate in the face of growing hostilities of the sect, the government was compelled to form a Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2003 and by 2007, the JTF launched "Operation Flush" to arrest and stem the tide of Boko Haram activities. When in 2009 the JTF succeeded in killing Yusuf, who founded Boko Haram, his successor, Abubakar Shekau after a year of preparation pushed the conflict into a more virulent phase (Falode, 2016). The sect began to embark on new tactics and methods such as suicide-bombing which compelled the federal government to set up the Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in 2011 (Vanguard, 2011).

As the conflict became more intense, government was pushed to mobilize 100, 000 soldiers to frontally confront the menace in addition to adopting strategies to counter terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. In May 2013, Nigeria declared a state of emergency in the three northern states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno which were the main operation zone and a strong hold of the Boko Haram. During this period, Nigeria also set up a

civilian Joint Task Force to complement the efforts of the military in fighting Boko Haram in addition to creating a new military formation, the 7th Division in Maiduguru charged with the mandate to tackle the activities of the sect (Erunke, 2013). The government further passed the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2013 so as to legalize the measures cited above and to promote effectiveness of its coordination. The Act stipulates among other provisions, death penalty sentences for terrorists and insurgents and the destruction of suspected terrorist enclaves and, at the same time, Nigerian government offered to dialogue with the sect to no avail. (Marama, 2014 in Falode, 2016).

The new Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari in December 2015, announced that Boko Haram has been crushed technically. (BBC, December, 2015) and, in January, 2016 declared that Boko Haram was now on “fall-back” (Nwabughio, 2016 in Adewunmi, 2016).

By Late 2015, much of the territories hitherto controlled by Boko Haram had been recovered making it impossible for the sect to launch conventional attacks against the federal troop. As a result, Boko Haram militia fell back into its stronghold at Sambisia forest.

The great success achieved by the state against Boko Haram at this stage was attributable to a number of factors: Engagement of troops from neighbouring countries and most helpfully the white South African Mercenaries, the STTEP (Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection) (Freeman, 2015) who not only trained elite counter terrorism troops in Nigeria but conducted sorties against Boko Haram (Falode, 2016). By adopting a “relentless pursuit tactic to confront Boko Haram’s push and pull tactic, success in containing the sect offensives began to emerge (Freeman, 2015). By the time the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) came in late 2015 to assist Nigeria in her war against terrorism, the STTEP had already successfully put off Boko Haram into a defensive position. However, it was only when troops from Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin under the MNJTF command were introduced to the war in late 2015 that the counter offensive yielded more permanent results (Ademenmi, 2016). The foregoing notwithstanding, the war is far from being over as the Boko Haram has resorted to using guerrilla tactics, using under-aged-suicide bombers, avoiding open and conventional confrontations with the military.

The question that may agitate the dispassionate mind at this juncture is: why has the Boko Haram insurgency persisted despite all efforts and resources committed to exterminating it? Attempts will be made to provide answers to this question in the subsequent section.

Factors Responsible for Boko Haram Unabated Wars

The Boko Haram war in the northern states of Nigeria can safely be termed a war of many battles. From available literature, one can deduce that the reasons behind the continued persistence of the Boko Haram wars include but by no means limited to the following factors: improper definition of the conflicts; unclear motive of the Boko Haram sect; poverty and youth unemployment rate; politization and corruption, amongst others. We shall attempt to discuss each of these factors in full.

Improper Definition of the Conflict

As mentioned earlier, many scholars and researchers have written extensively on the origin and objectives of Boko Haram. Brilliant works such as Anyawu and Nwanaju (2010); Agbeboas (2013); Sampson Eyituyo (2013); Adeolu Ademenmi (2014); and Solomon (2012) all contain excellent accounts and motivations of the Boko Haram but most of these works fail to define the nature of the conflict and tend to assume that Nigeria is waging a war on terror (Falode, 2016). Falode further argues that the poor conceptualization of the operations of the sect is a basic encumbrance in properly analyzing the situation. According to him, even in the medical sciences, total cure of an ailment is usually dependent on accurate diagnoses or prescription. He contends that Nigeria will be better positioned to tackle the Boko Haram menace only if the nature of the conflict is well understood which he describes as Hybrid warfare and not necessarily a counter-terrorist war (Hoffman, 2007 in Falode, 2016).

What then is Hybrid warfare? According to Mathis and Hoffman (2007) as cited in Folade (2016), Hybrid wars combine both conventional and unconventional tactics to prosecute its battles. This include but not restricted to terrorism in its various manifestations as kidnapping, suicide-bombing, beheading of victims, etc. It incorporates multi-dimensional activities that can be handled by separate units or even the same unit which are not strategically focused and coordinated within an operational zone so as to achieve an effective synergy.

Evidently, Hybrid wars are not the same as the conventional types due to the use of a combination of tactics, strategies, mode and weapons of the both type of warfares (Moseley, 2002). Accordingly, this kind of warfare involves a combination of the use of ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide-bombings, sexual assaults as well as targeted assassinations. Falode (2016) further argues that while the both modes are essentially integrated in operations and fused tactically the irregular components apparently become the decisive point because they do not just aim at protracting the war as in guerilla war; provoke unprecedented reactions as in terrorism; or exacerbate security costs for the defender as evidenced in counter-

terrorism/insurgency. The blistering run of the Islamic state (IS) over Tikrit and Mosul in Iraq in 2014, provide a good example of hybrid warfare. Here the Islamic state fighters utilized an array of sophisticated weapons and engaged highly skillful army who combined the conventional and unconventional warfare modes to dislodge the Iraqi-US trained army. (The Washintin Times, Nov. 2014).

From the above stand point, Falode (2016), tends to assert that Nigeria can only successfully develop an effective strategy against Boko Haram if the nature of the war is well understood/acknowledged.

Unclear Motive of the Boko Haram

As noted earlier, many scholars have written extensively on the ideology, motivation or the propelling force behind the Boko Haram sect. their comments stem from what the name “Boko Haram” stand for and of course, their overriding operations. Boko Haram which is said to mean “Western Education is evil”. This implies that western education and all it stands for should be ahored and resisted totally. If education here should be seen from the poin of view of its literary meaning, then one wonders how this can be possible considering also that most of the sophisticated weapons which the sect uses are all products of western education. Hence, western education so to speak, is more or less indispensable. However, if what is meant here is western civilization and ideology which is western universalism implying that all civilizations should adopt western values-a view which indeed, infuriates Islamic fundamentalists, then the opinion of Huntington that the conflicts between Christianity and Islamic religions which the two opposing divides represent is indeed a clash of civilization. For instance, the Boko Haram in Nigeria initially fought to establish sharia government in Borno State but after the death of its founder, Yusuf, in 2009, its goal under Abubakar Shekau extended to outright Islamization of the entire country; the circularity of Nigeria notwithstanding (MENAR, 2005). What makes this seeming established motive a bit unclear again is the fact that Boko Haram also attacks Moslems and Moslem’s establishment in Nigeria. A case in point is the attack on the Shehu of Borno and the Emir of Kano coupled with bombings of some mosques in Kano (Kola Wole, 2012).

The question is, if this is truly a Jihad, could it be right to assume that Boko Haram attacks, sometimes, are arbitrary? Or would it be better to think that such attacks targeted on fellow Moslems resulted from a perceived anti-Muslim tendencies exhibited by the victims? Whichever, is the case, this study agrees with the contention of Hammes (2006) that “insurgents have the nihilistic goal of ensuring the government cannot function and it is easier to achieve insurgent (Boko Haram) goal than governing, as it is easier and more directed to use military power than to apply political, economic and social techniques”.

By implication, while insurgents can use violence to delegitimize a government; simply application of violence by the government cannot restore that legitimacy. From the above standpoint, we content that Boko Haram remains a political not a military struggle and therefore not amenable to purely military solution without resorting as is the case, to unprecedented brutality which may be unacceptable in contemporary global environment.

Similarly, some have argued that Boko Haram in Nigeria is a ‘Northern agenda’ established to unwittingly frustrate the Goodluck Jonathan administration because of a perceived grievances of the northern leaders who felt shortchanged after president Yaradua’s death. However, the onslaught had continued into president Buhari’s regime who boasted it would end shortly if he was elected president in 2014. The argument here is that, it is easier to create a monster than to destroy it. We shall discuss this aspect latter in this study.

Poverty and Youth Unemployment

There is a continuous academic debate on the correlation between poverty and insecurity. Some scholars argue that most conflicts in developing countries result from endemic poverty. Scholars like Kanbur (2007) cited in Awojobi (2015), assert that there is causality from high poverty rate to conflict. Ted Gurr in his deprivation theory explains why youth always resort to violence. According to the theory of Deprivation, “aggression is always a consequence of frustration” and “frustration always lead to aggression” Leeds, (1978); cited in Awojobi (2015). “The poor are led to violence owing to their relative deprivation and needs” (Odumosu, 1999) in Awojobi, 2014). In light of the foregoing, frustration, lack of income, unemployment have prompted the youths particularly in Northern Nigeria to enlist as Boko Haram foot soldier. Among the leading scholars of the poverty breeds conflict hypothesis are Sarmineto and Bacerra (1998) and Sarmiento (1999). However, the likes of Ciaitan (1995); Rubio (2000); Sauchez and Nunez (2001) and Sauchez, Salimano and Formisano (2005) all cited in Awojobi (2014), objected to this hypothesis. However, empirical evidences from the works of Collier and Hoeffler (2002); Bellows and Miguel (2006); Ford (2007), indicated that poverty was the major cause of conflict in Africa; while Rice et al. (2006), (collier and Hoeffler (2002); Fearon (2004). Walter (2004), all subscribe to the notion that poverty helps to extend conflicts once it started (Awojobi, 2014). A study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler from the Oxford University, James Fearso and David Laitin both from the Stanford university gave credence to this hypothesis (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).Table 2, blow illustrates their findings.

Table 2: Key findings of capita income and conflict

Source	Findings
Collier/Hoeffler (2004)	Countries at different income levels have the following risk experiencing civil conflict at \$250 GDP per capita, a 15% risk of war within 5 years; at \$600 GDP per capita, 7.5% risk of war within 5 years; and at \$5,000 GDP per capita, less than 1% risk of war within 5 years (Humphreys, 2003)
Fearon/Laitin (2003)	Countries at different income levels have the following risk of experiencing civil conflict: at \$579 GDP per capita, a 17.7% risk of war within 1 year; at \$2,043 GDP per capita, a 10.7% risk of war within 1 year; and at \$9,466 GDP per capita, less than 1% risk of war within 1 year
Sambanis (2003)	Average GDP per capita for countries that experienced war within 5 years is \$2,176. Average GDP per capita for countries that did not experience war within 5 years is \$5,173
Collier/Hoeffler/Rohner (2006)	Average GDP per capita for countries that experienced war within 5 years is \$1,100. Average GDP per capita for countries that did not experience war within 5 years is \$5,764

Source: Rice et. Al (2006 cited in Awojobi, 2014).

Though many, particularly security experts in Nigeria have debunked the assertion that Boko Haram insurgency is caused and sustained by the high poverty rate particularly in Northern Nigeria, one must admit that even if the group has its antecedents in theology, its swelling rank results from a huge reservoir of unemployed youths in the country. Omoha (2013) empirical study on why do youth join Boko Haram, came out with the result indicating that poverty is indeed instrumental to youth enrolment into the Boko Haram sect.

Similarly, Udu and Abah (2016), noted that unemployment rate in Nigeria in 2003 stood at 14.8 per cent; declined to 11.09 per cent in 2005 due to some Poverty Alleviation Programmes which in the way or the other improved socio-economic situation of the people particularly in the informal sector. However, the rate decreased sharply from 14.9 percent in March 2008 to 9.7% in March, 2009 (NBS, 2010). Similarly, unemployment trend in Nigeria from 2010 to 2014 shows that as at 2010, unemployment rate stood at 21.1 percent; 23.9% in 2011; 24.3% in 2012; 28.5% in 2013 and projected at 20% in 2014 (IATE) in Udu and Abah (2016). The implication of this scenario particularly on youths involvement in crime is quite obvious. Particularly, we therefore contend that poverty and unemployment rate in Nigeria significantly constitute factors that cause and sustain the tempo of Boko Haram in the country.

Politics and Corruption

Our investigation show that many attribute the unabated Boko Haram wars to politics and the prevalent corruption in all facets of the country. For instance, in the political sphere, many had believed that Boko Haram represent a Northern agenda to make the country ungovernable by the Goodluck Jonathan administration. This is generally because the north felt shortchanged by the emergency of Goodluck as president instead of a northern candidate.

Sani of Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) “No force can stop Boko Haram...the Federal Government should commit itself openly and unambiguously in guaranteeing the security of the leaders of Boko Haram when they eventually come out for dialogue,,,” portrays Boko Haram as at then as a military wing of the ACF (Godson Offoaro, 2010). Again, recall that an elder states man of the ACF, Adamu Chiroma had cried out in 2010, that Nigeria will be made ungovernable should a non-northern Muslim succeed the then sick Yar-Adua; the Chairman of the ACF, Joseph Waku had once said “Igbos can’t blackmail the north, go home if you are tired of staying” and, this statement came on the wheels of the ultimatum issued to southerners to vacate the north by the Boko Haram (Daily Sun, Jan 22, 2017).

These statements that came after a long suspicious silence of the north at the early stage of the Boko Haram Wars on Nigeria gave credence to the allegation that highly placed individuals unwittingly fuelled the escalation of Boko Haram.

In the same vein, the abduction of 276 Chibok girls on April 2014 was also believed to have been stage-managed to frustrate the Jonathan led administration. The general outcry this generated both within and outside Nigeria really scored the federal government under Goodluck low particularly as efforts to rescue the girls continually proved abortive.

Similarly, many believe that the abduction 110 girls from Dapchi on February 19, 2018, and their subsequent release was stage-managed to score president Buhari high in political rating. To lend credence to this allegation, Osai Ojighog, Nigerian Director of Amnesty International asserted that the military/police failed to

handle the Dapchi case well, they were alerted hours before the arrival of the Boko Haram factional group and also considering that the Buhari government had withdrawn security from the area, a whole month before the incident (Sahara Reporters 2018).

Again, in president Jonathan January 9, 2013 address, he noted that part of the difficulty in defeating Boko Haram is that the group has infiltrated both the government and the military. Corruption is yet another problem in the fight against Boko Haram. According to Gallup survey released in January, 2010, close to 95% of the populace believe that the government is corrupt. In a survey conducted by the Tell magazine, 2012, it was revealed that among the four categories of soldiers interviewed, the lower ranks said that any soldier on a 24hours duty against the sect receives N500 stipends making a total of N3500 weekly and, regretted that they are sent to die for mere N3500/week (Agbo and Suleiman 2012). Considering the huge budgets on security in the country, the above report shows a high level of unseriousness and corruption among the security officials and tend to whittle down the efforts at defeating the Boko Haram. This is apparently so when we consider that In 2016 alone, Nigeria spent \$2.6 billions on Boko Haram humanitarian crisis (Bolashodun, 2016).

Boko Haram Insurgency: Implications on Socio-Economic Development

Apart from the human cost of Boko Haram insurgency as presented in Table 1, the sect atrocities has negative implications on sustainable socio-economic development of Nigeria particularly in the northeast where Boko Haram has dominance. Awojobi (2014); Eme & Ibietan (2012); Nkwede & Nwogbaga (2016), noted that the economic, social and psychological costs of the insurgency is unquantifiable. Awojobi (2014) noted that business operations in the affected zones have been drastically reduced because of the relentless attacks of the sect in addition to irregular bank operations and shops due to fear of attacks. As a result, there is evident human capital and investment downturn which ultimately hamper socio-economic development of the area (Okereocha, 2012).

The study conducted by Nkwede & Nwogbaga (2016) indicated that Boko Haram insurgency have been a major impediment to the socio-economic development in the country as it has drastically affected educational growth and development, infant mortality, increased poverty and heightened health challenges especially in the northern Nigeria. The sectoral spread of Boko Haram damages in Northern Nigeria is shown in table 3, 4, 5, and 6. below.

In table 3, we observe that the North-East has the least literacy level; with male (18.1%) and female (15.4%); closely followed by South East with 66.1% (male) and 69.9% (female) and then South-West having the highest rate at 77% (male) and 79.9% (female) literacy levels. Clearly, females had higher percentages of literacy levels in both South-West and South-East but lower in the North-East which implies that women in the North-East are more educationally disadvantaged than men unlike in the South-East and South-West observed above.

Again in table 4, one observes that the North-East had the highest infant mortality rate with 109%; followed by the South-East (95%) and the South-West (59%) per 1000 live-Births.

The data contained in table 5, indicates that North-East with 19.7% had the lowest percentage of Births delivered by skilled health providers while South-East and South-West had 82.3% and 82.5%, respectively. In other words, the percentage of births delivered traditionally in the North-East by unskilled persons is by far higher than those delivered by skilled health providers and, this accounts for the high infant mortality rate recorded in table 4 above.

Similarly, table 6, shows that the percentage of births delivered in a health facility is lowest in the North East (19.5%); followed by South-West (75.6%) and South-East (78.1%).

Table 7 shows maternal mortality in the three geo-political zones of the country. Here, the North-East. 286 and 165, respectively.

On Distribution of Health personnel and incidence of poverty presented in table 8 below, again the North-East had the highest with 76.3% and the lowest distribution of health personnel. It should equally be noted that the North –East which incidentally is the zone with dominance of Boko Haram is the only region above the national average of 69.0% poverty rate in the country.

Table 3: Literacy of males & Females

Geopolitical zone	Male	Female
South-West	77%	79.9%
South-East	66.1%	69.9%
North-East	18.1%	15.4%

Source: Obasanjo (2016)

Table 4: Infant Mortality Rate Per 1000 Live Births

Geo-political zone	Percentages (%)
South-West	59%
South-East	95%
North-East	109%

Source: Obasanjo (2016)

Table 5: Percentage Delivered by Skilled Provider

Geopolitical zone	Percentage (%)
South-West	82.5%
South-East	82.3%
North-East	19.9%

Source: Obasanjo (2016)

Table 6: Percentage delivered in a Health Facility

Geopolitical zone	Percentage (%)
South-West	75.6%
South-East	78.1%
North-East	19.5%

Source: Obasanjo (2016)

Table 7: Maternal Mortality

Geopolitical zone	Maternal mortality as per 100,00
South-West	165
South-East	286
North-East	1,549 (highest in the country)

Source: Obasanjo (2016)

Table 8: Distribution of Health & Incidence of Poverty

Geopolitical zones	Distribution of Health personnel among the zones	Incidences of poverty
South-West	26%	59.1%
South-East	16%	67.0%
North-East	9.5%	76.3% ^s

Source: Obasanjo (2016)

From the data shown in the above tables, it is abundantly clear that Boko Haram insurgency constitute a great impediment to educational development in Nigeria; particularly in the North-East. By implications, Boko Haram atrocities translates to war against western education in those affected zones of the country. According to Awortu (2015), in Borno state, the attacks had destroyed over 882 classrooms as at August 2013; in Yobe state, all schools were shut from June to September, 2013. Similarly, the Federal Government on March 6, 2014, closed five Federal Colleges in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states and ordered an estimated 10,000 students to relocate to other schools (Nkwede & Nwogbaga, 2017). On the other hand, parents fearing the security of their children have withdrawn thousands of them from schools in the region already acclaimed the most educationally backward in the country (Ogundiya, 2008).

Furthermore, a report by the UNDP in partnership with Oxford Nigeria indicated that 46% of households in Nigeria's North-East, borrow money to eat while 61% of residents in the region lack access to portable water. Note, that the North-East of Nigeria comprises, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states. A report by the Livelihood and Economic Recovery Assessment, 2016 came up with a number of key findings after an assessment conducted by Oxfam Nigeria on behalf of the UNDP in four states (Borno, Adamawa, Gombe and Yobe) eight LGAs, 24 wards and 3,258 sampled households. The report indicated that 30% of the households in the region were economically inactive, 86% spend more than they earn, 55% lack sanitation facilities, while their socio-economic situations were diverse within the surveyed locations.

Other significant findings in the North-East affected by the Boko Haram nefarious activities as contained in the report, the UNDP stated inter-alia:

One economically active member of a household sustains 2.3 non-active members, while a majority of them do not have sufficient food supply. The average income per household per month is 860 and they spend on the average, 42% of their income on food, 26% on education and health services, 8% on paying debts and 6% on firewood.

Continuing, the report added that: In addition, 46% borrow money to buy food, 41% rely on alternative health care, 21% send their children out to work and beg. Income from skilled labour dropped from 21% before the crisis in the region to 5%, 23% of the households are led by women and 14% are widows, 40% of women are pregnant and/or lactating, 11% support a member with a mental or physical disability, while 21% include, at least, one member with a chronic illness.

A similar survey by the UNICEF Nigeria, showed that 1.2 million children have been displaced in the North-east of the country. Out of this figure, more than half of the children were below the age of 5 and are also at risk of violence.

The survey estimates that half of all the children in Nigeria experience physical violence, one in four girls and one in ten boys experience sexual violence and one in six girls and one in five boys experience emotional violence before they reach the age of 18 years. Less than 4% get the help they need to recover (Obinna, 2016).

According to Nnodim (2016), the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria over the periods of its operations had resulted in a protracted humanitarian crisis which led to numerous deaths as well as the mass displacement of an estimated 2,241,484 individuals and 334,608 households. It is equally important to note that the cardinal objective of the UNDP assessment was to obtain reliable information on the economic and social realities of the local population and the internally displaced persons so as to have a comparative analysis between the affected population of Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe states.

Recently, an American independent Research and Education organization, the Fund for Peace, ranked Nigeria 14th out of the 177 countries listed as the most failed states in the world on the basis of security (Eme, 2012). Considering the indicators used for the ranking, Nigeria's worst scoring categories were in Group Grievance (9.6), Uneven Development (9.0) and Legitimacy of the state (9.0), Public Services (9.0), Security Apparatus (9.1), and Factionalized elite (9.5) (Eme, 2012).

The overall implications of Boko Haram insurgency for sustainable socio-economic development of the country is that economic growth is hampered, the economy fast deteriorating. This is even as funds that could have been channeled for human and institutional capacity development are diverted to security issues. Annually, the highest expenditure of the country's budget has been in the security sector. For instance, in the 2015 budget, N934 billion was allocated for security-the highest for the year. Similarly, the figures for 2011 and 2012 were N920 billion thrown into the security sector in 2013 and 2014 (Olufemi, 2015) yet the war seems unending despite that it has caused an estimated 100,000 deaths in the last five years.

Between 2011-2015 continued Olufemi (2015), the office of the National Security Adviser got a capital allocation of N240 billion while the Defence Ministry got N206 billion making the capital allocations to the office of the National Security Adviser higher than that allocated to the entire Defence Ministry which includes the army, Navy and Airforce.

According to the Chief of Defence Staff, Major General Abayomi Olomsakin, Nigeria spent more than \$2.6 billion in 2016 to address the humanitarian challenges caused by Boko Haram terrorists (Bolashodun, 2016). The above scenario is worrisome considering the debt profile of the country, which according to DMO (2017) increased from N17.36 trillion at the end of 2016 to N21.7 trillions at the end of December 2017 (an increase of 25%) which according to the report represents 18.20% of the country's GDP.

IV. CONCLUSION/ RECOMMENDATIONS

The study aimed at examining the implication of terrorism and insurgency for sustainable Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria with particular attention to North-Eastern states. The study specially attempted to investigate the factors responsible for continued persistence of insurgency typified by Boko Haram in the Northeast despite concerted efforts of Nigerian government to contain it. Findings reveal that such factors as improper definition of the conflict; unclear motive of the Boko Haram sect; poverty/youths unemployment; politics/ corruption; among other related issues account for the unending onslaught of the sect and that over 100,000 deaths were recorded within the period under review in addition to rendering over two (2) million people homeless; situations that have exacerbated the already pervasive poverty in the affected zone.

The position of the study is that Boko Haram atrocities have become one of the worst holocaust in recent Nigeria history. We contend that security is everybody's business and must not be politicized else, Nigeria will continue to make progress in circles without lasting solution to the malady.

The study recommends among others that:

- There should be re-orientation to inculcate ethical values and reverence for life and human right and the need to co-exist irrespective of religious inclinations. wanton killings can never be a service to God.
- Nigeria government should strategize to create meaningful employment for the youths encapsulated in programmes which aim at addressing the endemic poverty in the North-East in particular and the country in general.

- To ultimately end a major armed conflict, it is necessary to understand the nature of the war. The South Africa mercenaries did, and this modulated remarkable result in fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria. Nigeria should sustain this impressive tactic of “relentless pursuit” in prosecuting the war against Boko Haram.
- To address the international dimension to the onslaught, government need to erect fences in the borders calculated to be easily accessible to terrorists and intensity security therein.
- There should be special courts to try suspected cases of insurgency/terrorism rather than the judicial courts which can be slow in their processes. Convicts should be summarily dealt with according to the statutes on terrorism so as to serve as deterrence to prospective terrorists.
- Finally, Nigeria leadership need to cue into the clarion call for dialogue with Boko Haram with a view to understanding their real motive and ultimately ensuring security/protecting the lives and property of the affected citizens.

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